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CRIMINAL LAW/CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—
ARTICLE 26 OF THE MASSACHUSETTS DECLARATION OF 
RIGHTS: THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT’S “CRUEL” AND 
“UNUSUAL” NEGLECT OF ITS LONGEVITY COMPONENT 
Thomas H. Townsend* 
Article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, which prohibits 
“cruel or unusual punishments,” is arguably broader in scope than 
its federal counterpart, the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  In addressing constitutional challenges to the length of 
incarceration sentences, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
utilizes essentially the same test under Article 26 as the United States 
Supreme Court does under the Eighth Amendment.  Among other 
considerations, the tests compare the subject sentence of a crime to 
the potential sentences for more serious crimes within the same 
jurisdiction, as well as to the prescribed sentences for the same crime 
in other states.  This is an unduly restrictive analysis, however.  A 
comparison of merely theoretical sentences under analogous statutes 
sheds no light on whether an imposed sentence is, in reality, 
excessively long.  Instead, Massachusetts appellate courts should 
compare the subject sentence to sentences actually imposed for 
comparable crimes both within and outside of the jurisdiction.  Only 
then can a court accurately gauge whether a particular sentence of 
incarceration is actually “unusual.”  The limitations of the current 
approach can be appreciated by considering a hypothetical case 
involving statutory rape, which is a potential life felony in 
Massachusetts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When Justice William Brennan challenged state supreme courts to 
interpret their state constitutions to be more protective of individual rights 
than the United States Supreme Court had the federal Constitution,1 few 
courts accepted the challenge with as much alacrity and gusto as the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC).  In the forty years since 
then, the SJC has consistently and resoundingly rejected restrictive 
Supreme Court precedent in favor of a broader approach to individual 
rights and liberties under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.2  The 
 
1. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977). 
[S]tate courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the full protections 
of the federal Constitution.  State constitutions, too, are a font of individual 
liberties, their protections often extending beyond those required by the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of federal law.  The legal revolution which has brought 
federal law to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective 
force of state law—for without it, the full realization of our liberties cannot be 
guaranteed. 
Id. 
2. See Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 857–66 (Mass. 2014) (rejecting 
application of United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976) and Smith v. Maryland, 442 
U.S. 735, 744 (1979) to cellular service location information (CSLI) and requiring a separate 
search warrant under Article 14 for such data); Commonwealth v. Balicki, 762 N.E.2d 290, 
297–98 (Mass. 2002) (rejecting Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990) and clarifying 
that Article 14 retains an “inadvertence requirement” for plain-view discoveries); 
Commonwealth v. Mavredakis, 725 N.E.2d 169, 177–79 (Mass. 2000) (rejecting Moran v. 
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 433 (1986) and holding that Article 12 requires police to inform a 
suspect undergoing interrogation of his attorney’s efforts to contact him); Commonwealth v. 
Gonsalves, 711 N.E.2d 108, 111–12 (Mass. 1999) (rejecting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 
106, 120–21 (1977) and concluding that Article 14 prevents an exit order of stopped motorist 
without suspicion); Commonwealth v. Amirault, 677 N.E.2d 652, 660, 676 (Mass. 1997) 
(rejecting Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845–46 (1990) and holding that Article 12 
encompasses a defendant’s right to confront witnesses “face to face”); Commonwealth v. 
Stoute, 665 N.E.2d 93, 94–95, 97 (Mass. 1996) (rejecting California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 
627–29 (1991) and holding that a pursuit intended to stop and detain an individual is the 
functional equivalent of a seizure under Article 14 and therefore must be effectuated only when 
there is a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct); Commonwealth v. Lydon, 597 N.E.2d 36, 
39–40 (Mass. 1992) (rejecting South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 561–62 (1983) and 
holding that Article 12 prevents the admission of a defendant’s refusal to take a breathalyzer 
test); Guiney v. Police Comm’r, 582 N.E.2d 523, 526 (Mass. 1991) (rejecting Nat’l Treasury 
Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674–75 (1989) and holding that Article 14 prohibits 
random urine testing of police officers in the absence of concrete, substantial governmental 
interest); Commonwealth v. Amendola, 550 N.E.2d 121, 125–26 (Mass. 1990) (rejecting United 
States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 90–92 (1980) and adopting the “automatic standing” rule under 
Article 14, thereby permitting defendants to seek to suppress evidence where possession is an 
element of the charged offense); Commonwealth v. Doe, 544 N.E.2d 860, 862–63 (Mass. 1989) 
(rejecting Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 108–09 (1988) and holding that Article 12 
permits the withholding of subpoenaed evidence if the act of production would be 
incriminating); Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548, 556–57 (Mass. 1985) (rejecting 
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justifications for the more expansive interpretation of the state constitution 
can be stated succinctly: the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights is both 
older and broader.  As former Chief Justice Herbert P. Wilkins noted, 
Our Constitution is older than the Federal Constitution.  Much of the 
Federal Bill of Rights is derived from concepts appearing in our 
Declaration of Rights.  We need not move lock-step with Washington 
on every point.  I think of the Supreme Court as describing a common 
base from which we can go up.  We often agree with them.  We are 
not trying to be contrary.  We are, however, entitled to our own views, 
indeed constitutionally required to have them.3 
But noticeably absent from these declarations of independence was 
an enhanced role for Article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights, which prohibits the infliction of “cruel or unusual” punishments.4  
Although the SJC relied on Article 26 to banish a form of punishment 
permitted under the federal Constitution (the death penalty),5 the justices 
have not parted with their federal brethren when it comes to challenges to 
the length of sentences of incarceration—which is surprising.  After all, 
the SJC was an early proponent for extending the cruel-or-unusual 
prohibition—traditionally understood to curtail barbarous types of 
 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238–39 (1983) and holding that Article 14 requires that probable 
cause undergird both an unnamed informant’s basis of knowledge and reliability); Freeman v. 
Wood, 401 N.E.2d 108, 112–13 (Mass. 1980) (rejecting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 
(1935) and upholding the availability of additur under Article 15). 
3. Herbert P. Wilkins, Remarks of Chief Justice Herbert P. Wilkins to Students at New 
England School of Law on March 27, 1997, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1205, 1213 (1997).  Other 
justices, both of the SJC and the Massachusetts Appeals Court, have echoed these sentiments.  
See Robert J. Cordy, Criminal Procedure and the Massachusetts Constitution, 45 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 815, 833 (2011) (“Where the U.S. Constitution sets a floor below which no state can go, 
the expectations with respect to liberty and privacy of those who authored the Massachusetts 
Constitution and of the community that constitution governs today require more.”); Joseph A. 
Grasso, Jr., “John Adams Made Me Do It”: Judicial Federalism, Judicial Chauvinism, and 
Article 14 of Massachusetts’ Declaration of Rights, 77 MISS. L.J. 315, 340 (2007) (citation 
omitted) (“[T]he SJC has often recognized its authority and duty to interpret and enforce cognate 
provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution that afford greater protections than its federal 
counterpart.”); Roderick L. Ireland, How We Do It in Massachusetts: An Overview of How the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Has Interpreted Its State Constitution to Address 
Contemporary Legal Issues, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 405, 407 (2004) (quoting Charles G. Douglas, 
State Judicial Activism—The New Role for State Bills of Rights, 12 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1123, 
1145 (1978)) (“Because the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights is a sovereign document, the 
SJC has an ‘obligation to make an independent determination’ of [its provisions] . . . .”). 
4. MASS. CONST. art. 26. 
5. See Op. of the Justices, 364 N.E.2d 184, 186–89 (Mass. 1977); Dist. Att’y v. Watson, 
411 N.E.2d 1274, 1281–87 (Mass. 1980). 
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punishment6—into the realm of sentence duration.7  In fact, the United 
States Supreme Court relied on a precedent from the SJC when it extended 
the Eighth Amendment’s protection to sentence longevity.8  Nonetheless, 
to this day, the SJC adheres to the Supreme Court’s approach in substance 
and form when reviewing such challenges.9 
It is an unduly fettered analysis, however.  Both courts employ tests 
that compare the subject sentence to those allowed for more serious crimes 
within the jurisdiction and to prescribed penalties for comparable crimes 
in other jurisdictions.10  But these considerations are at odds with Article 
26’s language and scope.  Unlike the Eighth Amendment, Article 26 is 
explicitly aimed at judges: “No . . . court of law shall . . . inflict cruel or 
unusual punishments.”11  So it makes little sense to consider the potential 
penalties available for other crimes; those theoretical sentences may never 
be imposed in practice.  Rather, Article 26 demands a comparison between 
the sentence at issue and other sentences inflicted.12  Only then can it be 
determined if a subject sentence is actually “unusual.”  To demonstrate 
the shortsightedness of the current, theoretical approach, and to commend 
a more reality-based analysis, a hypothetical case involving a sentence for 
statutory rape is considered. 
I. ARTICLE 26 AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT: SIMILARITIES AND 
DIFFERENCES 
The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights is “one of the great, 
enduring documents of the American Revolution.”13  It is, in fact, “the 
oldest functioning written constitution in the world.”14  Authored by John 
Adams, “[t]he Massachusetts Constitution is unique in that it not only 
predates the Federal Constitution, but was also used as a model for it.”15  
 
6. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446–47 (1890).  But see O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 
323, 339–40 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Eighth Amendment “is 
directed . . . against all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly 
disproportioned to the offenses charged”). 
7. See McDonald v. Commonwealth, 53 N.E. 874, 875 (Mass. 1899), aff’d, 180 U.S. 311 
(1901). 
8. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910) (quoting McDonald, 53 N.E. at 
875). 
9. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Perez, 80 N.E.3d 967, 974–75 (Mass. 2017). 
10. See Commonwealth v. Therriault, 515 N.E.2d 1198, 1200 n.3 (Mass. 1987) (noting 
that federal and state tests are “virtually identical”). 
11. MASS. CONST. art. 26; Sturtevant v. Commonwealth, 33 N.E. 648, 649 (Mass. 1893) 
(“This article is directed to courts, not to the legislature.”). 
12. See MASS. CONST. art. 26. 
13. DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 225 (2001). 
14. Id. 
15. Ireland, supra note 3, at 407 (footnote omitted). 
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Both the Massachusetts and the U.S. constitutions enshrine a provision 
curtailing the infliction of certain “punishments.”16  Article 26 reads: “No 
magistrate or court of law, shall demand excessive bail or sureties, impose 
excessive fines, or inflict cruel or unusual punishments.”17  The Eighth 
Amendment provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”18  Although 
similarly worded, the provisions contain two differences.  One difference 
is of negligible significance; however, the other is potentially important. 
The more noticeable difference is that Article 26 bans “cruel or 
unusual punishments,” while Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and 
unusual punishments.”19  The reason for this difference is unclear.  The 
antecedent for both provisions is the English Declaration of Rights of 
1689, which used the word “and.”20  Nonetheless, Article 26 contains the 
disjunctive “or,” which mirrored state constitutional provisions already in 
use in Delaware, Maryland, and North Carolina.21  Eleven years later, the 
drafters of the Eighth Amendment followed the provision from the 
Virginia Declaration of Rights, which itself was taken virtually verbatim 
from the English Declaration of Rights and contained the conjunctive 
“and.”22  One influential SJC jurist posited “that art. 26 stands on its own 
footing,” due to the use of the word “or,” and argued “that a punishment 
may not be inflicted if it be either ‘cruel’ or ‘unusual.’”23  But Chief Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes had years earlier scoffed at the notion that the 
word difference made a difference: “[T]he word ‘unusual’ must be 
construed with the word ‘cruel,’ and cannot be taken so broadly as to 
 
16. See MASS. CONST. art. 26. 
17. Id. 
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
19. Compare MASS. CONST. art. 26 (emphasis added) (banning punishment that is cruel 
or unusual), with U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added) (banning punishment that is cruel 
and unusual). 
20. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966–67 (1991). 
21. Id. 
22. See id. 
23. Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1289 (Mass. 1980) (Liacos, 
J., concurring). 
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prohibit every humane improvement not previously known in 
Massachusetts.”24  The Court has adhered to this view ever since.25 
The other difference concerns the infliction of the punishments.  The 
Eighth Amendment states simply that cruel and unusual punishments shall 
not be inflicted.26  Article 26, on the other hand, is explicit: “No magistrate 
or court of law, shall . . . inflict cruel or unusual punishments.”27  
“[A]rticle [26] is directed to courts, not to the legislature.”28  The 
significance of this direction has yet to be appreciated. 
II. PARALLEL APPROACHES 
Notwithstanding any language dissimilarities in their respective 
constitutions, both the Supreme Court and the SJC have “recognized that 
it is possible that imprisonment for a long term of years might be so 
disproportionate to the offense as to constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment.”29  Nonetheless, “[o]utside the context of capital punishment, 
successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have 
been exceedingly rare.”30  In fact, aside from cases involving life 
sentences without the possibility of parole,31 the Supreme Court has never 
 
24. In re Storti, 60 N.E. 210, 211 (Mass. 1901); accord Watson, 411 N.E.2d at 1299 
(Quirico, J., dissenting) (labeling the dissimilarity a “slight difference”); Commonwealth v. 
O’Neal, 339 N.E.2d 676, 704 (Mass. 1975). 
In the absence of historical evidence suggesting that the framers meant to proscribe 
every new form of punishment, regardless of its nature, or every form of 
punishment which might be characterized as “cruel” without regard to its 
ordinariness, I believe Chief Justice Holmes’s reading of the two adjectives 
together is the only sensible construction of the phrase. 
Id. (Reardon, J., dissenting). 
25. See Commonwealth v. McGonagle, 88 N.E.3d 1128, 1131 n.2 (Mass. 2018) (citation 
omitted) (“We have never interpreted the phrase ‘inflict cruel or unusual punishments’ under 
art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights more broadly than the United States Supreme 
Court has interpreted the phrase ‘cruel and unusual punishments inflicted’ under the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution . . . .”). 
26. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
27. MASS. CONST. art. 26. 
28. Sturtevant v. Commonwealth, 33 N.E. 648, 649 (Mass. 1893). 
29. Cepulonis v. Commonwealth, 427 N.E.2d 17, 19 (Mass. 1981) (citing McDonald v. 
Commonwealth, 53 N.E. 874, 875 (Mass. 1899), aff’d, 180 U.S. 311 (1901)); see Graham v. 
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010). 
30. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980); see United States v. Polk, 546 F.3d 74, 
76 (1st Cir. 2008) (using the idiom “hen’s-teeth rare” to describe the frequency of successful 
challenges). 
31. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment forbids 
a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without [the] possibility of parole for juvenile 
offenders[, including those convicted of murder].”); Graham, 560 U.S. at 74–75 (invalidating a 
life sentence without parole for a juvenile convicted of a non-homicide crime); Solem v. Helm, 
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found a sentence imposed in a criminal case violative of the Eighth 
Amendment simply due to its length.32  As for Massachusetts, with the 
exception of a recent line of cases involving juvenile offenders,33 neither 
the SJC nor the Massachusetts Appeals Court has ever held a sentence to 
be constitutionally excessive—either under the Eighth Amendment or 
Article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.34  Due to this dearth 
 
463 U.S. 277, 299, 303 (1983) (finding unconstitutional a life sentence without parole for 
passing a worthless check, after the defendant’s seventh nonviolent felony). 
32. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 64, 70–77 (2003) (upholding sentence of two 
consecutive twenty-five-years-to-life terms under recidivist statute for stealing videotapes in a 
habeas corpus proceeding); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28–31 (2003) (upholding a 
twenty-five-years-to-life sentence for theft of golf clubs under a recidivist law); Harmelin v. 
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961, 994–96 (1991) (upholding a sentence of life without parole for 
possession of 650 grams of cocaine); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 371, 373–74 (1982) (per 
curiam) (upholding forty years for a conviction of marijuana distribution and possession with 
intent to distribute); Rummel, 445 U.S. at 265–66, 285 (affirming life without parole for 
obtaining money by false pretenses; third nonviolent felony); Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 
391, 393–94 (1916) (upholding concurrent five-year sentences for mailing letters in execution 
of scheme); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 631 (1912) (finding life sentence under 
three-strikes law did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment). 
33. See Commonwealth v. Lutskov, 106 N.E.3d 632, 636 (Mass. 2018) (holding that 
mandatory twenty-year minimum sentence for juvenile offender’s armed home invasion 
“violates the proportionality requirement inherent in art. 26”); Commonwealth v. Perez, 106 
N.E.3d 620, 624 (Mass. 2018) (concluding that juvenile’s sentence for nonhomicide offense 
with parole eligibility after twenty-seven and one-half years was excessively long in the absence 
of “extraordinary circumstances”); Commonwealth v. Perez, 80 N.E.3d 967, 970 (Mass. 2017) 
(“[W]here a juvenile is sentenced for a nonmurder offense or offenses and the aggregate time 
to be served prior to parole eligibility exceeds that applicable to a juvenile convicted of murder, 
the sentence cannot be reconciled with art. 26 [absent an individualized hearing].”); Diatchenko 
v. Dist. Att’y, 1 N.E.3d 270, 284–85 (Mass. 2013) (alteration in original) (“[T]he discretionary 
imposition of a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole on juveniles who are 
under the age of eighteen when they commit murder in the first degree violates the prohibition 
against ‘cruel or unusual punishment[]’ in art. 26.”). 
34. See Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 596 N.E.2d 325, 330–32 (Mass. 1992) (upholding 
two-year mandatory enhancement for school-zone violations); Commonwealth v. Grimshaw, 
590 N.E.2d 681, 686 (Mass. 1992) (fifteen to twenty years for manslaughter); Commonwealth 
v. Tart, 557 N.E.2d 1123, 1135 (Mass. 1990) (thirty days—twenty-three suspended—for fishing 
without a permit); Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 540 N.E.2d 1316, 1323–24 (Mass. 1989) 
(consecutive life sentences for forcible rape of a child); Commonwealth v. Therriault, 515 
N.E.2d 1198, 1200–01 (Mass. 1987) (upholding one-year minimum mandatory for homicide by 
motor vehicle while intoxicated); Commonwealth v. Tuitt, 473 N.E.2d 1103, 1105, 1112 (Mass. 
1985) (affirming life sentence for armed robbery while masked, where defendant was a habitual 
offender); Commonwealth v. Bianco, 454 N.E.2d 901, 905–06 (Mass. 1983) (eighteen months 
for assault and battery); Cepulonis, 427 N.E.2d at 19–21 (forty to fifty years for possession of a 
machine gun); Op. of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 393 N.E.2d 313, 318–20 
(Mass. 1979) (involving mandatory twenty-five-year sentence for dealing narcotics with street 
value of $25,000); Commonwealth v. Nolin, 364 N.E.2d 1224, 1228–29 (Mass. 1977) (life 
sentence for second-degree murder); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 344 N.E.2d 166, 170–74 
(Mass. 1976) (one-year minimum mandatory for carrying a firearm); Commonwealth v. 
Morrow, 296 N.E.2d 468, 472, 476–77 (Mass. 1973) (involving sixteen-year-old defendant; 
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of actual examples of disproportionality, the Supreme Court repeatedly 
resorts to its life-sentence-for-a-parking-ticket hypothetical to animate the 
principle.35 
“Although punishment may be cruel and unusual not only in manner 
but length, ‘a heavy burden is on the sentenced defendant to establish that 
the punishment is disproportionate to the offense for which he was 
convicted.’”36  Reviewing courts recognize that “[i]n matters of 
punishment, of course, the Legislature has primacy, and its action carries 
a presumption of validity.”37  Consequently, appellate judges “do not 
lightly second guess or upset the Legislature’s independent determinations 
concerning particular conduct it wishes to criminalize and the sanctions it 
wishes to prescribe for that conduct to vindicate the community’s 
legitimate interests in a secure, peaceable, and orderly society.”38  “Only 
where the punishment is so disproportionate to the crime that it shocks the 
conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity may [a 
court] declare a criminal sanction to be in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment or art. 26.”39 
“In order to mitigate the inherent subjectivity in the ‘shocks the 
conscience’ standard, a growing number of courts, [the SJC] among them, 
have attempted to develop a more objective framework for the evaluation 
 
several sentences up to forty years); Commonwealth v. Harding, 186 N.E. 556, 556–58 (Mass. 
1933) (upholding five to eight years for receiving stolen papers worth six cents and bank book 
worth ten cents); Sturtevant v. Commonwealth, 33 N.E. 648, 649 (Mass. 1893) (affirming 
twenty-five years for larceny, where defendant was a habitual criminal); Commonwealth v. 
Hitchings, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 482, 486 (1855) (twenty to thirty days for single sale of 
intoxicating liquor); Commonwealth v. Medina, 835 N.E.2d 300, 313–14 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) 
(upholding two concurrent life sentences for rape of a child, to be followed by twenty- to thirty-
year concurrent sentences for indecent assault and battery convictions); Commonwealth v. 
Dunn, 680 N.E.2d 1178, 1182–84 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997) (twenty-year minimum mandatory for 
home invasion); Commonwealth v. Derry, 522 N.E.2d 436, 437 n.2 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988) 
(seven to ten years for conspiracy to traffic in marijuana); Commonwealth v. Silva, 488 N.E.2d 
34, 38–39 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986) (ten-year minimum mandatory for cocaine trafficking); 
Commonwealth v. Hamm, 471 N.E.2d 416, 419 n.1, 423 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984) (upholding 
concurrent life sentences for armed robbery and assault with intent to rape followed by twenty-
six to forty years for other crimes); Commonwealth v. Marcus, 454 N.E.2d 1277, 1277–80 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1983) (affirming five-year mandatory sentence for selling heroin, where 
defendant was a repeat offender). 
35. See, e.g., Ewing, 538 U.S. at 21 (“[T]he proportionality principle ‘would . . . come into 
play in the extreme example . . . if a legislature made overtime parking a felony punishable by 
life imprisonment.’” (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274 n.11)). 
36. Jackson, 344 N.E.2d at 170 (quoting Commonwealth v. O’Neal, 339 N.E.2d 676, 680 
(Mass. 1975)). 
37. Marcus, 454 N.E.2d at 1278 (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 379 
(1910)). 
38. Dunn, 680 N.E.2d at 1182. 
39. Op. of the Justices, 393 N.E.2d at 319 (citing Jackson, 344 N.E.2d at 170). 
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of the constitutionality of criminal sentences.”40  Under Article 26, 
Massachusetts courts employ a tripartite test for disproportionality, which 
the SJC adopted from a decision of the California Supreme Court.41  Using 
this test, the court considers: 
(1) the “nature of the offense and the offender in light of the degree of 
harm to society”; (2) “a comparison between the sentence imposed 
here and punishments prescribed for the commission of more serious 
crimes in the Commonwealth”; and (3) “a comparison of the 
challenged penalty with the penalties prescribed for the same offense 
in other jurisdictions.”42 
The Supreme Court utilizes a comparable three-pronged test in the 
federal context.43  The main difference is that, under the Eighth 
Amendment, a court will not engage in the intra- and inter-jurisdictional 
analyses unless the “threshold comparison of the crime committed and the 
sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality,” which 
is a “rare case.”44 
III. STATUTORY RAPE IN MASSACHUSETTS 
Massachusetts has, without question, the most draconian statutory 
rape law in the country.  It is a strict liability offense, carries a potential 
life sentence, and contains no exception based on the perpetrator’s age45: 
Whoever unlawfully has sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual 
intercourse, and abuses a child under 16 years of age, shall be punished 
by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for any term of years or, 




41. See Jackson, 344 N.E.2d at 170–71 (citing In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921, 930–32 (Cal. 
1972)). 
42. Commonwealth v. Bianco, 454 N.E.2d 901, 905–06 (Mass. 1983) (quoting Cepulonis 
v. Commonwealth, 427 N.E.2d 17, 20 (Mass. 1981)). 
43. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 60–61 (2010); see also Commonwealth v. 
Therriault, 515 N.E.2d 1198, 1200 n.3 (Mass. 1987) (comparing the federal test to the state test 
adopted in Jackson, 344 N.E.2d at 170–71). 
44. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30 (2003) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 
957, 1005 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). 
45. In fact, “[w]hen two minors have consensual sexual relations, both of whom are 
members of the class the statute is designed to protect, each has committed a statutory rape.”  
Commonwealth v. Wilbur W., 95 N.E.3d 259, 263 (Mass. 2018).  Consequently, at least twenty 
percent of ninth and tenth graders in Massachusetts have committed life felonies.  See id. at 274 
(Gants, C.J., concurring) (“[C]onservatively estimated, prosecutors potentially have the ability 
to prosecute at least one in five ninth and tenth graders for rape and abuse of a child.”). 
46. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 265, § 23 (2018). 
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Because lack of consent is not an element of the crime, all that the 
prosecution needs to prove is “that the accused had sexual intercourse with 
a person who was less than sixteen years old at the time.”47  And while 
other states have modernized their statutes in recent years by incorporating 
age-gap or “Romeo and Juliet” clauses for like-aged peers,48  
Massachusetts has gone in the opposite direction by instituting 
mandatory-minimum sentences based on certain age differentials.49 
Nonetheless, both the SJC and the Massachusetts Appeals Court have 
rejected Article 26 and Eighth Amendment challenges to the law.  In 
Commonwealth v. Murphy, the defendant contended that his conviction 
for having carnal knowledge of a girl under sixteen years of age 
constituted cruel or unusual punishment.50  The SJC rejected the 
contention, concluding that “it is clear that the punishment prescribed is 
not cruel or unusual in kind,”51 notwithstanding that the girl was almost 
sixteen years old. 
[W]hatever we may think of the policy of a statute that treats a girl of 
15 years and 11 months old, however mature she may be in body and 
mind, as if she were incapable of committing the crime of fornication, 
and subjects a boy of the same age, with whom she joins in sexual 
intercourse, to a possibility of the same punishment as if he were guilty 
of murder in the second degree, the legislature is ordinarily the judge 
of the expediency of creating new crimes, and of prescribing penalties, 
whether light or severe, for prohibited acts.  We cannot say that the 
punishment prescribed for this offense, when the girl is nearly 16 years 
of age, and voluntarily participates in it, is beyond the constitutional 
power of the legislature to inflict.52 
The court affirmed the Murphy holding three-quarters of a century 
later in Commonwealth v. Moore.53  There, the defendant was a twenty-
three-year-old pimp, who had intercourse with a runaway fourteen-year-
 
47. Wilbur W., 95 N.E.3d at 263. 
48. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-6101 (2018); see also Danielle Flynn, All the Kids Are 
Doing It: The Unconstitutionality of Enforcing Statutory Rape Laws Against Children and 
Teenagers, 47 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 681, 687–90 (2013) (discussing age-gap provisions that 
“either decriminalize sexual conduct between persons close in age or reduce the crime from a 
felony to a misdemeanor,” and Romeo and Juliet clauses that provide an affirmative defense if 
the requisite age qualifications are met). 
49. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 23A (2018) (requiring a mandatory-minimum sentence 
of ten years depending on the age difference between the defendant and the victim). 
50. Commonwealth v. Murphy, 42 N.E. 504, 504 (Mass. 1896). 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Commonwealth v. Moore, 269 N.E.2d 636, 639–40 (Mass. 1971). 
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old girl.54  The defendant challenged his conviction under the Eighth 
Amendment, which, by that time, had been judicially incorporated into 
the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the states.55  The court noted that 
it had already “considered this point in Commonwealth v. Murphy and 
upheld the statute.”56  Although “[t]he possible penalties remain 
Draconian,” the court did “not deem them disproportionate to the offence 
shown in this case.”57 
The defendants in both Murphy and Moore challenged the potential 
penalties contained in the law.  The SJC has since clarified that, in 
weighing a cruel-and-unusual-punishment challenge, a reviewing court 
looks only to the sentence that a defendant actually received, not 
theoretical ones.58  Such a challenge was brought in Commonwealth v. 
Medina, where a defendant received two concurrent life sentences for the 
statutory rapes of his stepdaughter, who was between ten and twelve years 
of age at the time.59  The defendant claimed that, 
[T]he sentences imposed by the trial judge, both individually as to the 
rape convictions, and collectively, by way of the twenty- to thirty-year 
concurrent sentences on the indecent assault and battery convictions, 
to run from and after the life terms, constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment, as proscribed by the Eighth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and art. 26 of our Commonwealth’s Declaration of 
Rights.60 
The Appeals Court rejected the constitutional challenges, concluding 
that the sentences were “lawful[,] . . . within the statutory limits,” and 
tailored to the case.61 
IV. THE TEST APPLIED 
A hypothetical case62: Clark was a high school senior, age seventeen 
years and six months.  Kimmy was a sophomore at the same school and a 
 
54. Id. at 637–38. 
55. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 664–68 (1962). 
56. Moore, 269 N.E.2d at 640 (citation omitted). 
57. Id. 
58. See Cepulonis v. Commonwealth, 427 N.E.2d 17, 19 n.1 (Mass. 1981) (“This court 
adjudges only whether the right of this petitioner to be free of cruel and unusual punishment has 
been violated in this case.”); Commonwealth v. Therrien, 269 N.E.2d 687, 691–92 (Mass. 1971) 
(observing that defendant sentenced to life imprisonment cannot challenge the statute as 
violative of the Eighth Amendment simply because it allows for capital punishment). 
59. Commonwealth v. Medina, 835 N.E.2d 300, 305–06, 306 n.3 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005). 
60. Id. at 313 (emphasis added). 
61. Id. at 313–14. 
62. The underlying facts are loosely drawn from Commonwealth v. Rivera, No. 09-P-
1865, 2011 WL 166399 (Mass. App. Ct. Jan. 19, 2011).  See Brief and Appendix for the 
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month away from turning sixteen.  The two had met a year earlier at school 
and each considered the other to be a friend.  One day in the school 
corridor, Clark overheard Kimmy discussing with her friend, Paige, plans 
for the upcoming weekend.  Paige’s parents would be traveling abroad, so 
she invited Kimmy to watch a movie at her home on Saturday night.  Clark 
asked if he could come too.  They answered in unison, “Sure.  Why not?” 
On Saturday night, the three watched the movie in Paige’s upstairs 
bedroom.  While Paige sat on her bed, the defendant and Kimmy kissed 
on a pull-out trundle bed.  At one point, Clark put his hand inside Kimmy’s 
shorts and placed his hand over her underwear.  A short time later, Paige 
left the room and went downstairs for something.  As soon as Paige was 
gone, Clark pulled down Kimmy’s shorts.  Kimmy protested, “Don’t.  
She’ll be right back.”  Clark pleaded, “Come on, come on.”  Although she 
felt uncomfortable, Kimmy did not protest further, and the defendant put 
his penis into her vagina.  The sound of Paige ascending the stairs 
prompted Clark to roll off; Kimmy pulled her shorts back up.  The three 
resumed watching the remainder of the movie, after which Clark went 
home. 
For purposes of this hypothetical, we shall assume that Clark was 
charged as an adult,63 convicted after trial and sentenced to five years in 
prison.  If Clark were to challenge the sentence as violative of the Eighth 
Amendment and Article 26, a reviewing court would engage in the 
following analysis. 
A. Nature of Offense/Offender; Degree of Societal Harm 
The first “criterion requires a relatively abstract inquiry.”64  It 
“considers the nature of the offense and the offender in light of the degree 
of harm to society.”65  Although there is no exhaustive list of relevant 
factors, general considerations have included the defendant’s maturity, his 
criminal record, and whether the crime involved violence and a victim.66  
 
Commonwealth at 2–7, Commonwealth v. Rivera, No. 09-P-1865 (Mass. App. Ct.  2010), 2010 
WL 3096440, at *2–7; Brief and Appendix for Defendant-Appellant Raphael Rivera at 4–9, 
Commonwealth v. Rivera, No. 09-P-1865 (Mass. App. Ct.  2010), 2010 WL 1746479, at *4–9. 
63. The Massachusetts Legislature recently expanded the jurisdiction of the juvenile court 
to encompass seventeen-year-olds, although juveniles in that age group can still be treated as 
adults under certain circumstances.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 52 (2018).  For purposes of 
the hypothetical, we shall assume either that Clark qualified to be treated as an adult or that his 
case preceded this change.  Interestingly, the Legislature also recently raised the minimum age 
of criminal culpability to twelve.  Id.  So, consenting eleven-year-olds may legally engage in 
sexual intercourse, but consenting fifteen-year-olds may not. 
64. United States v. Rivera-Ruperto, 884 F.3d 25, 28 (1st Cir. 2018) (Barron, J., 
concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc). 
65. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 344 N.E.2d 166, 171 (Mass. 1976). 
66. See In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921, 930–31 (Cal. 1972). 
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For statutory rape specifically, factors can include whether there was 
coercion or threatened violence, the victim willingly engaged in sexual 
relations, there was a violation of trust, and there was a preexisting 
romantic relationship between the two.67  “The penological purposes of 
the prescribed punishment are also relevant to this analysis, 
for . . . ‘[c]learly the severity of the penalty, in the case of a serious 
offense, is not enough to invalidate it where the nature of the penalty is 
rationally directed to achieve the legitimate ends of punishment.’”68 
The hypothetical provides limited information on the characteristics 
of the offender.  We know that Clark was seventeen years old and a senior 
in high school.  As for the crime-related circumstances, Clark and Kimmy 
were friends, but were not romantically involved.  He sought her out to 
the extent that he asked if he could join her at Paige’s house, but there is 
no indication that it was part of a pernicious plan.  The intercourse 
involved some coercion (“Come on, come on”), but no overt violence.  
Any violation of trust would have related solely to their friendship, which 
is far different than a relationship where one has caregiving authority over 
another, such as a teacher, step-parent, or clergy member, to name a few. 
In weighing the degree of societal harm, the fact that Kimmy was 
close to sixteen years of age should be as irrelevant as whether or not she 
consented.  “The Legislature as a matter of public policy, for the 
protection of . . . children under the age of sixteen, has fixed an age below 
which a . . . child is to be held legally incapable of consenting to” sexual 
intercourse.69  “The law conclusively presumes that those under sixteen 
years of age are not sufficiently mature to understand fully the physical, 
mental, and emotional consequences of sexual intercourse, and are 
therefore incapable of making a rational decision about whether to consent 
to such conduct.”70  Through the statutory rape law, the Legislature has 
long recognized the immaturity of those under sixteen and sought to 
safeguard them regardless of the age or sophistication of their sexual 
partners.71  In fact, the Legislature recently amended the statutory rape 
law, adding a new section targeting adult offenders,72 but leaving Mass. 
 
67. State v. Davis, 79 P.3d 64, 71–72 (Ariz. 2003). 
68. Jackson, 344 N.E.2d at 171 (citation omitted) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 
111 (1958) (Brennan, J., concurring)). 
69. Commonwealth v. Gallant, 369 N.E.2d 707, 711 (Mass. 1977) (quoting Glover v. 
Callahan, 12 N.E.2d 194, 196 (Mass. 1937)). 
70. Commonwealth v. Dunne, 474 N.E.2d 538, 545 n.17 (Mass. 1985). 
71. See Commonwealth v. Washington W., 928 N.E.2d 908, 916 (Mass. 2010) (Cordy, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he age of consent is an important line in the law, intentionally laid down by the 
Legislature ‘to protect all children under sixteen years old from sexual abuse.’” (quoting 
Commonwealth v. Bernardo B., 900 N.E.2d 834, 845 (Mass. 2009))). 
72. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 23A (2018) (“[If] there exists more than a 5 year 
difference between the defendant and the victim and the victim is under 12 years of age[, or] 
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Gen. Laws chapter 265, section 23 intact, implicitly acknowledging its 
continued applicability to offenders who are closer in age to their victims. 
Moreover, the Massachusetts Appeals Court has reaffirmed the 
purpose of the statutory rape law and the suitability of its application to a 
seventeen-year-old who has sex with a fifteen-year-old.  In Driscoll v. 
Board of Trustees of Milton Academy, a seventeen-year-old student at 
Milton Academy, together with four of his hockey teammates, brought a 
fifteen-year-old girl into the boy’s locker room, where she performed oral 
sex on each of them.73  All of the boys were expelled from the school and 
prosecuted for statutory rape.74  The seventeen-year-old student sued the 
school for negligence, among other claims.75  In rejecting the negligence 
claim, the Appeals Court concluded that “the student may not recover in 
tort against the school for his own sexual misconduct.”76  Citing the 
statutory rape law and the maturity rationale of Commonwealth v. Dunne, 
the Appeals Court emphasized that a “seventeen year old who receives 
oral sex from a fifteen year old has committed statutory rape in this 
Commonwealth. . . . Our statutory rape law provides for punishment, not 
protection, for a seventeen-year-old for this conduct.”77 
Under these circumstances, a reviewing court would likely conclude 
that, based solely on the first criterion, Clark’s five-year sentence for rape 
of a child is not obviously disproportionate to the crime.  That would end 
the inquiry for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.78  Article 26 requires, 
however, that the other two prongs of the three-part disproportionality test 
be addressed. 
B. Intra-Jurisdictional Analysis 
The intra-jurisdictional analysis involves “a comparison between the 
sentence imposed here and punishments prescribed for the commission of 
more serious crimes in the Commonwealth.”79  Compiling “more serious” 
crimes can prove difficult, however.  “The crime of rape of a child, G.L. 
c. 265, § 23, encompasses a range of very different kinds of offenses.  That 
crime includes any number of acts whose seriousness [the courts] well 
 
there exists more than a 10 year age difference between the defendant and the victim where the 
victim is between the age of 12 and 16 years of age . . . [, the offender] shall be punished by 
imprisonment . . . for . . . not less than 10 years.”). 
73. Driscoll v. Bd. of Trs. of Milton Acad., 873 N.E.2d 1177, 1181 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007). 
74. Id. at 1181–83. 
75. Id. at 1181. 
76. Id. at 1184–85. 
77. Id. at 1184 (citations omitted) (citing Commonwealth v. Dunne, 474 N.E.2d 538, 545 
n.17 (Mass. 1985)). 
78. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30 (2003). 
79. Commonwealth v. Bianco, 454 N.E.2d 901, 905 (Mass. 1983) (quoting Cepulonis v. 
Commonwealth, 427 N.E.2d. 17, 20 (Mass. 1981)). 
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recognize.”80  Therefore, a court would likely conclude that the “more 
appropriate comparison” would be with penalties contained in other 
statutes that are designed to protect children.81  Those crimes and their 
accompanying penalties are as follows: 
• Indecent Assault and Battery on Person Fourteen or Older: 
“[I]mprisonment in the state prison for not more than five 
years, or by imprisonment for not more than two and one-
half years in a jail or house of correction.”82 
• Kidnapping Child Under 16: 
“[I]mprisonment in the state prison for not more than 15 
years.”83 
• Enticement of Child Under 16: 
“[I]mprisonment in the state prison for not more than 5 
years, or in the house of correction for not more than 2½ 
years, or by both imprisonment and a fine of not more than 
$5,000.”84 
• Posing or Exhibiting Child Under 18 in State of Nudity or 
Sexual Conduct: 
“[I]mprisonment in the state prison for a term of not less 
than ten nor more than twenty years, or by a fine of not less 
than ten thousand nor more than fifty thousand dollars, or 
by both such fine and imprisonment.”85 
• Dissemination of Visual Material of Child Under 18 in 
State of Nudity or Sexual Conduct: 
“[S]tate prison for a term of not less than ten nor more than 
twenty years or by a fine of not less than ten thousand nor 
more than fifty thousand dollars or three times the 
monetary value of any economic gain derived from said 
dissemination, whichever is greater, or by both such fine 
and imprisonment.”86 
 
80. Doe v. Att’y Gen., 715 N.E.2d 37, 44 (Mass. 1999). 
81. Commonwealth v. Dunn, 680 N.E.2d 1178, 1184 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997) (concluding 
that “punishments for similar offenses” may be a “more appropriate comparison” than 
punishments for “more serious offenses”). 
82. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 13H (2018). 
83. Id. § 26. 
84. Id. § 26C. 
85. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 29A (2018). 
86. Id. § 29B(a). 
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• Engaging in Sexual Conduct with Child Under Age 18 for 
a Fee: 
“[I]mprisonment in the state prison for not more than 10 
years, or in the house of correction for not more than 2 and 
one-half years . . . whether such sexual conduct occurs or 
not.”87 
Far from exceeding any of the penalties contained in these statutes, 
Clark’s sentence falls comfortably within (indeed, on the low end of) the 
permitted punishments.  In short, “[a] comparison [of] the . . . sentence 
imposed here and the punishments prescribed for more serious [or 
comparable] crimes in the Commonwealth, permits the conclusion that the 
sentence was not unconstitutionally excessive.”88 
C. Interstate Analysis 
The third prong requires “a comparison of the challenged penalty 
with the penalties prescribed for the same offense in other jurisdictions.”89  
In addressing this prong, a court looks only to those jurisdictions that 
criminalize the activity,90 whether they be numerous, as in Commonwealth 
v. Alvarez,91 or few, a situation that the Appeals Court faced in 
Commonwealth v. Dunn.92 
Here, only seven other jurisdictions have laws that would criminalize 
Clark’s intercourse with Kimmy: 
• California—up to six months imprisonment;93 
• Florida—up to fifteen years in prison;94 
• Georgia—up to one year of incarceration;95 
• Illinois—less than one year of imprisonment;96 
 
87. Id. § 53A(c). 
88. Commonwealth v. Bianco, 454 N.E.2d 901, 905 (Mass. 1983). 
89. Id. (quoting Cepulonis v. Commonwealth, 427 N.E.2d. 17, 20 (Mass. 1981)). 
90. See Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 596 N.E.2d 325, 332 (1992); Commonwealth v. 
Dunn, 680 N.E.2d 1178, 1183 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997). 
91. Alvarez, 596 N.E.2d at 332 (involving at least twenty-three states with comparable 
statutes). 
92. Dunn, 680 N.E.2d at 1183 (involving only two other jurisdictions). 
93. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5(b) (West 2018); CAL. PENAL CODE § 19 (West 2018). 
94. FLA. STAT. § 800.04(4) (2018); FLA. STAT. § 775.082(3)(d) (2018). 
95. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-3 (2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-3 (2018). 
96. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-1.50 (2018); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-1-14 (2018). 
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• Kansas—sentencing range of fifty-five to sixty-one 
months, with a presumptive sentence of fifty-nine months 
(for offender with no record);97 
• Michigan—up to fifteen years in prison;98 and 
• Wisconsin—up to nine months in prison.99 
As with the intra-jurisdictional analysis, an interstate comparison 
discloses that Clark’s sentence is not disproportionate to those prescribed 
by comparable statutes.  His five-year sentence was an available 
disposition in nearly half of the states with relevant provisions (Florida, 
Kansas, Michigan).  In fact, it practically mirrors the “presumptive” 
sentence in Kansas (fifty-nine months).  And it is substantially less than 
the sentences available in Florida and Michigan (up to fifteen years).  His 
sentence exceeds the punishment available only in Georgia (up to one 
year), Illinois (less than one year), and Wisconsin (up to nine months).  A 
Massachusetts court would likely conclude that, all in all, “[t]he difference 
between the punishment meted out in this case and that prescribed in other 
States is merely one of degree.  It is not violative of Article 26 or of the 
Eighth Amendment.”100 
V. THE CURRENT APPROACH: ITS SHORTCOMINGS AND A SUGGESTED 
IMPROVEMENT 
As shown above, the five-year sentence for statutory rape easily 
satisfied the second and third prongs of the disproportionality analysis.  
But both prongs suffer from two significant shortcomings. 
First, as noted earlier, the language of Article 26 is directed explicitly 
at judges–not the legislature–and prohibits them from inflicting cruel or 
unusual punishments.101  It therefore makes little sense, in gauging 
whether a particular sentence is excessively long, to consider potential 
penalties contained in other statutes.  Those theoretical penalties may 
never be imposed in practice.  If that is the case, then considering them 
necessarily skews the determination of whether the subject sentence is 
actually “unusual.” 
The second shortcoming undermines the very basis of the second and 
third prongs.  As will be recalled, the SJC derived its tripartite test from 
the California Supreme Court’s decision in In re Lynch.102  But the Lynch 
 
97. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5506 (2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6804 (2018); Nondrug 
Sentencing Guidelines, KANSAS SENTENCING COMMISSION, https://www.sentencing.ks.gov/
docs/default-source/2017-forms/2017-nondrug-grid.pdf [https://perma.cc/CS24-XDMZ]. 
98. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520d (2018). 
99. WIS. STAT. § 939.5 (2018); WIS. STAT. § 948.093 (2018). 
100. Cepulonis v. Commonwealth, 427 N.E.2d. 17, 21 (Mass. 1981). 
101. See MASS. CONST. art. 26. 
102. In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921, 930–33 (Cal. 1972). 
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decision harbored a startling judicial abdication of constitutional 
responsibility with respect to the test’s second and third prongs.  In 
justifying a comparison to potential penalties contained in comparable 
statutes within a jurisdiction (the second prong), the California Supreme 
Court stated that “although isolated excessive penalties may occasionally 
be enacted, [for example], through ‘honest zeal’ generated in response to 
transitory public emotion, the Legislature may be depended upon to act 
with due and deliberate regard for constitutional restraints in prescribing 
the vast majority of punishments set forth in our statutes.”103  In other 
words, the Legislature may be “depended upon” to prescribe penalties 
within constitutional limits; therefore, reference to those penalties is an 
appropriate constitutional yardstick for judges to use in reviewing prison 
sentences.  Quite a quaint notion.  And the court did not limit this 
deference to its own legislature’s enactments.  The court bestowed it upon 
the legislative enactments of other states (the third prong): “Here the 
assumption is that the vast majority of those jurisdictions will have 
prescribed punishments for this offense that are within the constitutional 
limit of severity.”104  Regardless of the merits or demerits of this approach 
as a matter of California constitutional law, the SJC should not have 
incorporated these aspects of constitutional abdication in its formula for 
assessing challenges under Article 26. 
A better approach presents itself.  And it is compatible with the 
existing three-pronged framework.  Rather than measuring a subject 
sentence against potential penalties in analogous statutes, Massachusetts 
courts should compare the sentence received to actual sentences 
previously imposed by Massachusetts judges for comparable crimes 
(prong two) and those imposed by judges in other jurisdictions for the 
same crime (prong three).  This approach would be consistent with Article 
26’s focus on punishments inflicted by a “court of law,” thereby 
presenting a more accurate picture of whether the sentence is truly 
“unusual.”  Moreover, it would jettison the naive assumption that 
legislatures act within constitutional limits in prescribing sentences.  And 
the compilation of such data should not be unduly burdensome.  In the late 
1980s, an industrious defense attorney presented findings from his review 
of over 2,600 cases in arguing that his client received an unconstitutionally 
harsh prison sentence for statutory rape.105  Doubtless such a task would 
be immeasurably easier in today’s era of sophisticated storage and 
retrieval of electronic data.  None of this is to say, of course, that Clark’s 
challenge to his sentence would be successful.  That would remain to be 
seen.  But this improved framework would ensure a more accurate 
assessment of his constitutional challenge. 
 
103. Id. at 931–32 (citation omitted). 
104. Id. at 932. 
105. See State v. Bartlett, 792 P.2d 692, 702 (Ariz. 1990), vacated, 501 U.S. 1246 (1991). 
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CONCLUSION 
The SJC has neglected Article 26’s longevity component for too long.  
The court’s recently renewed interest, as it relates to sentences for juvenile 
offenders, stems from the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. 
Alabama,106 not from any impetus independently originating from Article 
26.107  While this renewed interest is heartening, constitutional challenges 
to sentences for adult offenders remain unduly fettered by an unrealistic 
formula for gauging disproportionality.  The court can remedy this 
through the simple mechanism of requiring a comparison between a 
sentence at issue and other sentences previously imposed by 
Massachusetts and other judges for the same or similar crimes, rather than 
to theoretical ones.  Such an approach would better reflect the letter and 
spirit of Article 26. 
 
106. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012) (holding that the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits mandatory life sentences for juvenile offenders without the possibility of parole). 
107. See cases cited, supra note 33. 
